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Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach

Avery Katz*
ABSTRACT

The concept of "efficient breach"--the idea that a contracting party should
be encouraged to breach a contract and pay damages if doing so would be more
efficient than performance-is probably the most influential concept in the
economic analysis of contract law. It is certainly the most controversial.
Efficient breach theory has been criticized from both within and without the
economic approach, but its most prominent criticism is that it violates
deontological ethics-that the beneficiary of a promise has a right to
performance, so that breaching the promise wrongs the promisee.
This essay argues that this criticism is misplaced, and that efficient breach
theory, properly understood, is not inconsistent with parties' complying with
their deontological obligations. Instead, the intuitive resistance that most
people experience to the concept may be better explained by aretaic concernsspecifically, that failing to complete a contractual relationship is not conducive
to virtuous character or to the maintenance of a flourishing community. While
efficient breach can be squared with deontological ethics, it cannot be squared
with virtue ethics unless one is prepared to argue that seeking efficiency is a
virtue, or at least that it is not a vice.
INTRODUCTION

Contracts scholars have been arguing over the concept of "efficient breach"
for over thirty years. The issues at stake in this argument are well known, yet
the debate fails to subside. Supporters of efficient breach contend that allowing
a promisor to escape the obligation to perform by paying a money substitute
both increases the potential gain from contractual exchange, and corresponds to
the arrangement that most contracting parties would have wanted.' Critics of

Milton Handler Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. I am grateful to students and
colleagues at Columbia and to workshop participants at the University of Toronto, Case Western Reserve
School of Law, and the "Contract as Promise at 30" conference for helpful comments and encouragement on
this project.
1. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55-59 (1973); Robert L. Birmingham,
*

Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970); Robert L.
Birmingham, Legal and Moral Duty in Game Theory: Common Law Contract and Chinese Analogies, 18
BUFF. L. REV. 99 (1969); Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73
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the concept respond that allowing promisors to avoid performance without
securing the promisee's formal ex post consent works an injustice in the
individual2 case, and undermines the social practice of contracting more
generally.
These arguments are thoroughly familiar to anyone who teaches and writes
about basic contract law, because they have been rehearsed again and again in
the literature. Indeed, the debate has proliferated in recent years.4 Why do the
leading writers in the discipline continue to revisit a debate in which the main
positions have long been staked out? One possibility might be that they are
contending for the hearts and minds of their students, who, each year,
encounter the concept anew as they are introduced to the basic normative
underpinnings of contract law. On this explanation, efficient breach remains a
contested issue in contracts for the same reason that the fault principle remains
a contested issue in torts; it is a locus for conflict between values that are
inherently in tension, yet both deeply rooted in our political and moral culture,
so that the issue will never go away. An alternate possibility, however, which I
explore in this essay, is that the debate remains active because there are
important normative concerns that have still not been adequately clarified by
efficient breach's critics or addressed by its defenders.
The purpose of this essay is to suggest that the debate over efficient breach

CALIF. L. REV. 1432 (1985); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory ofEfficient Breach, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 554 (1977); Steven Shavell, Contracts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 436, 439 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Shavell, Contracts]. It is generally acknowledged that
Goetz and Scott coined the specific phrase "efficient breach" in their 1977 Columbia article; but the essence of
the concept is plainly manifest in Birmingham's and Posner's formulations.
2. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 17
(1981) ("[T]he contract must be kept because a promise must be kept."); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory
of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1989); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947 (1982);
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence ofContract and Promise, 120 -ARV. L. REV. 708 (2007).
3. See supra notes 1-2 (providing examples of theory addressed in literature); see also Richard Craswell,
Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988).
4. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Efficient Breach Theory Through the Looking Glass, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1679 (2008); Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568 (2006); Melvin
A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference
Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REv. 975 (2005); Gregory Klass, To Perform or Pay Damages, 98 VA.
L. REV. 143 (2012); Jody S. Kraus, A Critique of the Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. ONLINE
423 (2007); Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603 (2009);
Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation Interest,
97 VA. L. REv. 1939 (2011); Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 439 (2006)
[hereinafter Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?]; Steven Shavell, Specific Performance Versus Damages
for Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 84 TEX. L. REV. 831, 867 (2006) [hereinafter Shavell, Specific
Performance Versus Damages]; Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV.
1551 (2009); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Must I Mean What You Think I Should Have Said?, 98 VA. L. REV. 159
(2012); Shiffrin, supra note 2; Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, Wilfilness Versus Expectation: A PromisorBased Defense of Willful Breach Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1517 (2009).
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has focused on deontological concerns (specifically, whether contract breach is
equivalent to promise-breaking, and whether promise-breaking in the
contractual context is necessarily wrong) to the exclusion of aretaic ones
(specifically, that failing to follow through on a contractual relationship is not
conducive to virtuous character or to the maintenance of a flourishing
community). It argues that the standard deontological objections to efficient
breach do not substantially undermine its basic analysis, because they can
generally be addressed by reinterpreting or revising the underlying contract so
that paying a money substitute in lieu of specific performance is explicitly
authorized. On such a reinterpretation, paying money when performance
becomes inconvenient is neither a breach nor a wrong; it is just an alternate
way of discharging one's contractual duties. 5 In this way, "efficient breach"
(perhaps relabeled "efficient performance" or "efficient cancellation option" in
the interest of more favorable marketing6) can easily be squared with
deontological ethics.
The essay also suggests that the intuitive resistance that many people
experience to the concept of efficient breach may be better explained by aretaic
concerns-that is, by virtue ethics. The aretaic objection, unlike the
deontological objection, cannot be disposed of by reinterpreting the promise so
that paying money counts as performance rather than breach, because it is not
fundamentally based on the morality of keeping promises. Rather, it is based
on the morality of making promises in the first place. On this objection, a
promise that can be satisfied with a cash substitute is a cheap and superficial
one, and not the kind that we should valorize.
5. A point recognized early on and reiterated with regularity. See, e.g., David Simon & Gerald A.
Novack, Limiting the Buyer's Market Damages to Lost Profits: A Challenge to the Enforceabilityof Market

Contracts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1436-37 (1979).
As we see it, where both parties to a market transaction are market traders who are dealing with
commodities of fluctuating value, the contract should be treated as equivalent to a bet which the

parties are making against the future market price. Payment of market damages mounts to specific
performance of the bet.

Id.at 1436.
The view that a contract breach is the breaking of a promise overlooks the point that the contract that
is breached is generally an incomplete contract, and that the breach is what the parties want and

would have specified in a complete contract. In the example of the simple incomplete contract
calling for a desk to be produced, the seller who finds that his production cost would be $2,000 will
commit breach under the expectation measure. But in so doing, he will be acting precisely as would
have been set out in a complete contract, and it is that contract which is best regarded as the promise
between the parties that ought to be kept.
Shavell, Contracts,supra note 1, at 439.
6. Compare Brooks, supra note 4 (suggesting terminology of "efficient performance" as opposed to
efficient breach), with Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 4 (suggesting terminology of "dual performance" as

opposed to efficient breach).
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While the concept of efficient breach can be squared with deontological
ethics, accordingly, it cannot be squared with virtue ethics unless one is
prepared to argue that seeking efficiency is a virtue, or at least that it is not a
vice. The balance of this essay elaborates on these various claims.
THE CONSENSUAL BASIS FOR EFFICIENT BREACH

The practical problem that motivates the efficient breach debate is that
circumstances change over time and so contracting parties' plans often must
change too, even if those plans have been made the subject of a promise. For
example, a farmer may promise to sell crops, but the crops may fail. A
company that sells ice blocks for purposes of refrigeration may find itself
unable to obtain supplies at a sustainable price due to an unexpectedly warm
winter. 7 A coal company may promise to restore a parcel of land to its original
condition after strip mining, but the cost of restoration turns out to be
prohibitively expensive. 8 A consumer may promise to buy a boat, but then
suffer health or financial reverses that make it unattractive to go through with
the deal. 9 In each of these cases there are social gains
to be achieved--or
0
losses to be avoided-by adjusting the parties' plans.'
In the law and economics literature, this problem has generally been
addressed from an ex post perspective. On this perspective, the contract has
been formed, uncertainty about costs and benefits have been resolved, the
parties are deciding what to do next, and the options are performance or breach
(assuming that changed circumstances do not rise to the level of an excuse). At
this point, performance is efficient if (and only if) the benefits of performance
to the promise exceed the costs to the promisor."l If, conversely, the costs of
7. Goebel v. Linn, I1 N.W. 284 (Mich. 1882).
8. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
9. Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1972).
10. The news that motivates such adjustment does not have to be bad news; it could also be good newsfor instance if a new buyer arrives who places a much higher value on the items being exchanged and is willing
to pay a much higher price (or a new supplier emerges who can deliver at lower cost, and thus lower price).
11. The definition of efficiency used here, and in the law and economic literature, is potential Pareto
superiority, also known as the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, also known as cost-benefit analysis. According to this
criterion, an action (in this case breach of contract) is economically efficient when the gains resulting from the
action, aggregated over all parties who are affected, exceed the losses. In this case it is possible in principle,
and often in practice, to make all parties better off by arranging a side payment from the winners to the losers
(in the case of breach of contract, a payment from the breacher to the aggrieved promisee in the amount of
expectation damages). For a more extensive analysis and critique of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, see JULES L.
COLEMAN, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, in MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 95 (1988). This
formal definition of efficiency should be contrasted with one common meaning of the term in informal
discourse, where it is often used interchangeably with the term "advantageous." On this colloquial usage, an
unscrupulous businessperson might say that it is efficient to dump industrial waste in a public waterway,
because it is personally cheaper to do this than to pay the costs of ecologically secure disposal. This is not what
economists mean by efficiency, however, because it excludes the costs suffered by the other users of the
polluted water. The economist's view would be that dumping industrial waste could sometimes be efficient,
but only if it is the cheapest alternative considering the interests of all parties put together. If the costs of
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performance exceed the benefits, both parties can be made better off by
canceling the performance and having the promisor compensate the
disappointed promise by paying properly measured expectation damages. In
this instance, the promisee is no worse off than if the promisor had specifically
performed, and the promisor is better off (because paying damages is less
The resultant cost savings represent a net
costly than specifically performing).
2
increase in social welfare.'
Presenting the issue from the ex post perspective might suggest that there is
a conflict between economic efficiency and deontological justice, because the
cost savings are apparently achieved at the expense of the promisee's rights. A
stereotypical rights theorist would thus say that a promisor who breaches a
contract in order to achieve a larger profit or avoid a larger loss has
appropriated something that belongs to the promisee-the right to
performance-and used it for his own personal ends. On this view, an efficient
breacher is no better than a thief who steals and resells a car on the theory that
he knows where to get a price that is higher than the owner's reservation value
(that is, the maximum amount she would pay to retain the car). Both the thief
and the breacher profit from converting something that is not their own,
implying that any surplus thereby created is properly the entitlement of the
the car theft, the owner; and in the case of the broken
rightholder (in the case of
13
contract, the promisee).
But there is another way to look at the matter, an ex ante perspective that
shifts our attention from the later point at which the parties are deciding
whether to perform, to the earlier point where they are choosing to enter the
contract and specifying their duties. At this initial point, the parties have the
opportunity to decide who will hold the right to decide whether the promisor
specifically performs. As a matter of principle if not of law, they could allocate
that right to the promisee, by stipulating their advance consent to injunctive
relief.14 On the other hand, they could also allocate that right to the promisor

ecologically secure disposal (or of abstaining from the activity that generates the industrial waste) are greater
than the costs of pollution, only then would pollution be the efficient (least costly) alternative.
12. See POSNER, supra note l, at 57.
[11n some cases a party would be tempted to breach the contract simply because his profit from
breach would exceed the expected profit to the other party from completion of the contract, and if
damages are limited to a loss of expected profit, there will be an incentive to commit breach. There
should be .... If [the potential breacher'sloss from performance] is greater than the gain to the
other party from completion, it is clear that commission of the breach would be value maximizing
and should be encouraged. And because the victim of the breach is made whole for his loss, he is
indifferent; hence encouraging breaches in these circumstances will not deter people from entering

into contracts in the future.
Id. (emphasis added).
13. See, e.g., Friedmann, supra note 2.
14. In principle but not in law, because under common-law regimes, an equity court is not bound by the
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by providing for an explicit option to pay, in lieu of specific performance, an
amount of money representing the value of the promisee's expectation. One
way to do this is through a liquidated damages clause; but if the parties do not
or cannot agree on a liquidated amount, another method is to leave it up to a
court or arbitrator after the fact.
This ex ante perspective prompts the question: When is it desirable to
provide promisees with an option to buy their way out of a contractual promise
at a court-determined price, and when is it not? The answer offered by the
proponents of efficient breach is that providing such an option is typically
value-increasing, and thus in the interest of both parties. From this answer it
follows that the more efficient default rule
in cases where the parties have left
5
option.'
the
imply
to
is
silent
the matter
Here is a concrete example that illustrates the point: imagine a homeowner
who wants her driveway repaved and is shopping for a contractor. The
homeowner places some reservation value on the repaving work; this is the
maximum she is willing to pay in order to have it done. Without loss of
generality, suppose this reservation value equals $2000. It does not matter for
our purposes whether the homeowner's reason for wanting a new driveway is
commercial (i.e., it will increase the potential resale value of her home by
$2000) or personal (it will be more pleasant to look at, and will make the
driveway easier to shovel in winter). In either event, the homeowner does not
wish to spend more than $2000 on the driveway; if the driveway were going to
cost more than $2000, she would prefer to take the same amount of money and
spend it on her next-best budget priority, for example her wine collection.
Suppose the homeowner looks in the Yellow Pages and finds three possible
contractors. The first, which operates under the trade name of Reliable
Contractors, promises to finish any job it undertakes, "no matter what." The
second, Efficient Contractors, does not promise to finish any job it undertakes,
but does promise to pay a sum equal to the customer's lost expectation interest
if it does not finish. The third, Manhattan Contractors, does not promise to
finish its jobs and does not even promise to pay the customer's lost expectation

parties' agreement to specific performance. See, e.g., Stokes v. Moore, 77 So. 2d 331 (Ala. 1955) (denying
effect to parties' agreement, but the existence of the agreement can serve as evidence for the proposition that
money damages are inadequate).
15. Note that ex ante agreement is not the only way to achieve the benefits of efficient nonperformance.
The parties could alternatively wait for the new information to arrive and then agree on a mutually satisfactory
modification ex post. Whether this alternative is preferable depends on whether the costs of ex ante agreement
(primarily, errors in anticipating what allocation of rights is best, and the marginal transaction costs of
negotiating an extra term that in most cases will never come into application) exceed the costs of ex post
agreement (primarily, costs arising from haggling, delays, holdup, and bargaining failure). The advocates of
efficient breach argue that in many, and perhaps, most cases, ex ante agreement on a cash buyout is preferable
to waiting for an ex post modification; the main reasons are that waiting for an ex post modification imposes
extra risk on the parties, and creates incentives for wasteful expenditure of resources in anticipation of hold-up.
See Shavell, Specific Performance Versus Damages,supra note 4.
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interest, but it does promise that it will give its full deliberation in deciding
whether to show up to work, and to cheerfully refund any deposit if it does not
show up. All three contractors have excellent Better Business Bureau ratings;
they always keep their promises, or at least have so far.
It should be obvious that in a competitive market, the three contractors
cannot charge the same price and all stay in business, because it is more costly
to promise to finish a job, no matter what, than to promise to finish or pay
expectation, whichever is cheaper; and it is more costly to promise to finish or
pay expectation than it is to promise to show up to work if one feels like it. In
particular, there is some possibility that the contractor will turn out to have
performance costs of more than $2000 (either because the cost of labor and
materials has risen, or because some other job comes along that would pay
more than $2000 and it is not possible to undertake both).
The standard logic that implies that expectation damages lead to efficient
breach also implies that the homeowner is strictly better off hiring Efficient
Contractors than she is hiring Reliable Contractors. A full exposition of this
logic is available elsewhere, 1 6 but the intuition is straightforward. If she hires
Reliable Contractors, she gets her new driveway, and its $2000 value, with
certainty. If she hires Efficient Contractors, she gets either the driveway, or
enough cash to substitute for the anticipated appreciation in the value of her
house (if she is buying the driveway as an investment) or (if she is buying the
driveway for its consumption value) to buy a quantity of wine that will make
her just as happy as she would be having the driveway (though perhaps happy
in a different way). She gets $2000 worth of value either way, but 17Efficient
Contractors charges a lower price and accordingly offers a better deal.
Similarly, one can show that the homeowner is better off in expected terms
hiring Efficient Contractors than she is hiring Manhattan Contractors. The

16. See Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, supra note 4, at 444-45.
17. For example, suppose that the contractor's usual cost of performance is 1000, but one time out of ten
it turns out to be 6000 (because materials and preparation costs are unexpectedly high due to unforeseeable
ground conditions, or alternatively because an extremely lucrative job that would yield 6000 in extra revenue
comes up at the last minute and it is not possible for the contractor to undertake both). In this case, the reliable
contractor would have to charge at least 1500 in order to break even on the deal: 1500 = (90% x 1000) + (6000
x 10%). The homeowner would receive 2000 in benefits from entering into this agreement, and would enjoy a
net surplus of 500 (=2000-1500).
The efficient contractor's costs are lower than this, however, because it does not have to incur 6000 in
performance in the high-cost contingency; instead, it makes cash payment of 2000. Accordingly, to break even
it only needs to charge 1100 (1100 = (90% x 1000) + (2000 x 10%)). The homeowner would again receive
2000 in benefits from entering into this agreement, but would now enjoy a net surplus of 900 (=2000-1100).
Note that the 400 increase in consumer surplus corresponds to the avoidance of inefficiently costly
performance, ten percent of the time. Inefficient performance wastes 4000 (the difference between the 6000
cost of performance and the 2000 benefit it produces for the homeowner); this 4000 discounted by the one in

ten chance of incurring it equals 400. Note also that even if the homeowner attaches some subjective psychic
value to performance, above and beyond its pecuniary value, the efficient contractor is still the more desirable

partner so long as this psychic value is less than or equal to 400.
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reason is that Manhattan Contractors will only perform if its cost of
performance is less than the price it quotes, and will fail to perform otherwise.
But there will sometimes arise circumstances in which Manhattan's cost is
greater than the quoted price, but still less than the homeowner's $2000 value
of completion, so that Manhattan inefficiently fails to complete.
It follows that if the homeowner has strictly instrumentalist motives for
entering into the paving contract (that is, all she cares about is what she
receives when the parties' interaction is complete), she should choose to do
business with Efficient Contractors. Similarly, if she is not facing three
different contractors, but one contractor offering to do business under three
alternative contractual arrangements, differing only with respect to the
availability of specific performance or the amount of money to be paid if it
does not occur, she should prefer to do business under the efficient,
expectation-protecting contract.
One might object that the homeowner, or at least some homeowners, would
be willing to pay the price premium to hire the reliable contractor, in order to
have the satisfaction of knowing that the job will be done no matter what. But
the value of this satisfaction, if it exists, is properly incorporated in the
homeowner's expectation interest. In the above example, for instance, such a
preference simply means that the $2000 buyout payment does not fully
compensate for the homeowner's losses when the contractor fails to perform.
The payment thus needs to be increased by some additional amount sufficient
to compensate for the disutility associated with the mental adjustment of
receiving her utility in the form of wine instead of in the form of a new
driveway; and this adjusted amount is the proper measure of expectation.
Accordingly, unless the homeowner places an infinite value on getting her
driveway repaved as promised, there will be some amount of cash that will
make her happier than the driveway. She will therefore be better off dealing
with a contractor who promises to pay this amount of cash in lieu of the
driveway, than with the8 reliable contractor who promises to specifically
perform no matter what.'
If most promisees do not place an infinite value on having their promises
enforced, then a rule of law that provides for expectation damages-including,
we must stipulate, an appropriate premium for the mental and other costs of
adjusting to the fact that the promise is being discharged by cash payment
instead of the originally anticipated noncash performance-will make most
promisees better off than a rule requiring specific performance. Expectation

18. Note that even the most reliable contractor will encounter situations in which it is physically or
practically infeasible to perform, and the parties must specify, explicitly or implicitly, what amount of money is
available as a substitute for performance in that instance. The ultimate contract price will depend on the
amount that is chosen, just as it depends on the amount payable under contracts that do not require specific
performance.
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damages would therefore be justifiable as a default rule, providing the remedy
that most parties would prefer, and that, in a world of costless and complete
contracting, they would have explicitly chosen.' 9 If these assumptions hold,
awarding expectation damages is not only efficient, but maximally promotes
party autonomy.2 °
Indeed, on this line of argument, the term "efficient breach" is actually a
misnomer, because paying money in place of specific performance, if the
promisor finds it advantageous to do so, is entirely consistent with the best
understanding of the parties' agreement. Thus it is not a breach at all, but
rather an alternate way of discharging one's duties under the contract. Instead
of efficient breach, we might equivalently (and perhaps more clearly) speak of
"efficient performance" or "efficient cancellation option" or "efficient
rescission." And if there is no breach of promise, then there can be no
promissory wrong.
To be clear, I am not claiming that all, or even most, actual contracts are
consciously understood by the contracting parties as having this pay-or-perform
nature. Nor am I claiming that the cost-saving features of pay-or-perform
justify imposing it on parties who would prefer other remedies (or indeed, no
remedy at all). The argument is simply that the efficiency properties of pay-orperform make it a more useful term for most parties than perform-no-matterwhat, that it is therefore reasonable to imply it as a default rule in ordinary
contracts, and most importantly, that if parties include a pay-or-perform term in
their contracts, whether explicitly or implicitly, it is not a breach of promise
when it is exercised.
THREE TYPES OF OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT FOR EFFICIENT BREACH

Contributors to the literature on efficient breach have identified a number of
straightforward and well-known objections to the argument laid out in the
previous section. These overlapping objections include: (1) that the argument
above depends on empirical presuppositions that are not borne out in practice,
such as the assumption that expectation damages are routinely available at low

19. See Shavell, Contracts,supra note 1.
[T]he seller who finds that his production cost would be [greater than the buyer's reservation value]
will commit breach under the expectation measure. But in so doing, he will be acting precisely as
would have been set out in a complete contract, and it is that contract which is best regarded as the
promise between the parties that ought to be kept.
Id. at 439.

20. Because it minimizes the number of occasions on which the state implies a term that the parties do not
want, while leaving them free to contract around the implied term in the remaining cases. See Richard
Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989)
(arguing that consent-based arguments have no purchase when choosing a default rule of interpretation).
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cost and well measured by courts; 21 (2) that renegotiation ex post in the shadow
of a specific performance remedy, or ex ante assessment of damages in the
form of a liquidation clause, would more effectively protect parties'
expectation interests and promote efficient performance than ex post
assessment of money damages in an adversarial proceeding; 22 (3) that even if
money damages protect the parties' expectation interests under the contract in
question, they create a negative externality by undermining the certainty of
future bargains by third parties; 23 (4) that ordinary contracting parties are
boundedly rational and do not adequately consider the prospect of
nonperformance when they enter into agreements, and thus do not bargain for
the price adjustment that would properly correspond to that prospect under full
information; 24 (5) that many, and perhaps most, contracting parties attach a
distinct noninstrumental interest to performance that is incommensurable with
money, so that damages can never be truly compensatory; 25 (6) that ordinary
contracting parties do not in fact subjectively understand their agreements to
contain an implicit buyout option, but in fact believe that they have agreed to
specific performance; 26 (7) that the argument at most establishes hypothetical
consent to a rule of money damages, but only actual consent is morally
relevant.27
These objections are well known to scholars who follow the academic
literature on contract law; and it is not the place of this essay to discuss or
evaluate them in detail. Instead, I introduce them here in order to classify them
according to the category of normative argument into which they fall; and for
this purpose, three categories are relevant.
One type of normative argument arises from the consequentialist tradition,
which assesses the morality of actions and institutions based on whether they
21. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 989-97; Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency
of CompensatoryDamagesfor Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (1980); Macneil, supra note 2.
22. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979); Thomas S.
Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L.

REV. 341 (1984).
23. See, e.g., Friedmann, supra note 2, at 7; Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on
Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1092-93 (2000).
24. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 211, 225-36 (1995); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A
PsychologicalExperiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633 (2010).
25. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All "Legal Dollars" CreatedEqual?, 102 Nw. U.

L. REV. 223, 256-57 (2008); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in
Breach of Contract,6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405 (2009).
26. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1755 (2001). "As one transactor explained,

'[y]ou want performance, not payment for nonperformance. [Payment] is not fulfilling your deal.' And, as
another transactor put it, 'you do not just breach and pay. This is not done."' 1d; Shiffrin, Could Breach of
Contract Be Immoral?, supra note 4, at 1565-66.
27. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 166-73 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of
Silence: Default Rules and ContractualConsent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992).
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produce good or bad consequences. 28 This tradition includes both utilitarian
theories of morality as well as the concept of economic efficiency itself; it is
the normative mode in which contemporary economists are primarily schooled
and acculturated.
For instance, objection (1), that courts do not actually award true expectation
damages (because they are difficult to measure, or because some losses are
excluded as a matter of legal doctrine, or because it is costly to bring suit, or
because there is some chance the court will err or the aggrieved party will be
unable to prove his claim), is a consequentialist objection. To the extent these
concerns are empirically valid, the consequence of pay-or-perform will be that
actual promisors will have an inadequate incentive to perform and an excessive
incentive to breach. In this situation, attaching moral opprobrium to breach of
contract might well be an effective way of increasing the sanction for
nonperformance, leading to a more efficient outcome.
Similarly, objection (2), that the expectation interest is more cheaply and
effectively promoted by ex post renegotiation, undertaken in the shadow of a
legal right to specific performance, also provides a consequentialist objection to
efficient breach. To the extent the claim is empirically valid, specific
performance will provide an equally good incentive for efficient performance,
at lower transaction costs and with a lower incidence of error.
Objections (3), (4), and perhaps (5) can also be framed in consequentialist
terms. If pay-or-perform leads to third-party externalities or mistaken failures
to perform, or if it is not properly priced into the other terms of the contract,
then it will not have the efficiency consequences suggested above. For this
reason, proponents of efficient breach would typically acknowledge and accept
this set of objections.
A second type of objection arises from the deontological normative tradition,
which assesses the morality of actions and institutions based on whether they
respect rights, fulfill duties, and promote autonomy. 29 For a deontologist, the
fact that an act leads to good consequences is irrelevant if it is wrongful.
Wrongfulness depends instead on whether a choice conforms with a primary
moral norm (for example, do not lie or kill, do not treat other persons as ends in
themselves rather than means to an end). This is the mode of argument that
most closely corresponds to the normative vocabulary of the law; and it is a
mode of argument that most critics of efficient breach have deployed.
For instance, objection (6), that ordinary contracting parties do not in fact
understand their agreements to contain an implicit buyout option, but in fact

28. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win201 l/entries/consequentialism/.
29. See Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/ethicsdeontological/.
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regard themselves as having agreed to specific performance, is primarily a
deontological objection. Objection (7), that hypothetical consent does not
properly substitute for actual consent, is also a deontological objection.
Imposing upon the parties an agreement to which they have not agreed, even if
it is more efficient, deprives them of autonomy and fails to respect their
freedom to contract. Conversely, if the parties agreed to specific performance
but the law only requires money damages, the legal system has countenanced a
violation of the promisee's moral rights and the promisor's moral duties.
Objections (4) and perhaps (5) can also be framed in deontological terms. If
parties do not understand what they are getting into when they agree to pay-orperform, then they have not truly consented to the arrangement, and so the
party who elects payment over performance is profiting at the other's expense
and against her will. And most deontologists would insist that a payment of
money, without more, does not rectify the harm caused by breaching the
promisee's entitlement to performance.
Finally, a third set of objections can arise from a third normative tradition
that today is commonly referred to as virtue ethics. This tradition assesses
conduct based on whether it is grounded in or promotes the development of
good moral character, and is commonly denoted as "aretaic," deriving from the
ancient Greek word for virtue or excellence, arete. 30 The aretaic tradition is
less commonly invoked in legal scholarly circles than either consequentialist or
deontological arguments, but it has grown in influence in the philosophical
literature in the last31fifty years and has more recently begun to influence legal
scholarship as well.
While aretaic arguments have been much less prominent than
consequentialist or deontological ones in the literature on efficient breach,
some objections to pay-or-perform can be framed in such terms. For instance,
objection (5), that money can never be full compensation for the
incommensurable loss of nonperformance, suggests that there is a substantive
value embedded in contractual relationships that is worth preserving, even if no
person is harmed or wronged by their termination. Similarly, claims that
fiduciary nature of contractual relations also
efficient breach undermines the
32
can be framed in aretaic terms.

30. See Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N.
Zalta ed., Summer 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/.
3 1. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34
(1995); Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence:
METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003), reprinted in MORAL AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUES 163 (Michael Brady & Duncan
Pritchard eds., 2004). For an application of virtue theory to contract law generally, that also touches on the
primary argument of this essay, see Chapin F. Cimino, Virtue and Contract Law, 88 OR. L. REV. 703 (2009)
(considering how aretaic legal theory better captures parties' dual intents in contract than current theoretical

approaches).
32. E.g., Markovits & Schwartz, supranote 4, at 2004-05. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Contract and FiduciaryDuty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993) (outlining differences in scope and rigor
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By distinguishing among these three modes of normative argument, I do not
mean to suggest that they are mutually exclusive or that any particular
objection to efficient breach must fall into a single category. On the contrary,
several of the objections listed above could be classified in multiple ways. All
three types of argument are embedded in our33moral traditions, though perhaps
not to the same extent at all times and places.
Additionally, each of these modes of normative discourse is capable of
incorporating the core values of the other two. For example, consequentialist
theories all depend on some account of the good, but they vary depending on
what this account consists of. One consequentialist might take the position that
the good consists of human happiness but that happiness depends critically on
the exercise of autonomy within clearly delineated boundaries-in which case
the good is best promoted by articulating an intelligible set of rights and duties
and by establishing institutions that protect their observance.
Ruleutilitarianism is the classic statement of this position. A different sort of
consequentialist might argue that true human happiness derives from the
satisfaction of developing one's talents and capacities-that is, by pursuing
excellence.
Similarly, all deontological theories depend on some account of rights, but
they vary in what rights they consider fundamental. One deontologist might
take the position that all persons have a right to certain basic goods (e.g., food,
shelter, medical care, education) that enable them to formulate and pursue their
diverse individual goals. Alternatively one might argue that the right to
develop one's human potential is most important. These theories might overlap
considerably in what specific rights they prescribe (for example, the rights to
life and liberty would figure prominently under either of these theories) but
their substantive groundings-and the rhetoric used to defend them-could be
quite different. It is thus possible to reinterpret
in deontological terms the
34
concerns that I have here classified as aretaic.

of fiduciary and ordinary contractual obligations).
33. Hursthouse suggests that virtue ethics provided the dominant approach to Western moral philosophy
up through the beginning of the Enlightenment, but was eclipsed by deontology and utilitarianism in the
nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. See Hursthouse, supra note 30.
34. 1am indebted to both Seana Shiffrin and Kent Greenawalt for helping me understand this point. The
reinterpretation may be summarized as follows: while some moral duties are perfect, or categorically binding
(for example, the duty to refrain from making promises one has no intention of keeping), others are imperfect,
or binding to the extent it would be possible for everyone to fulfill them (for example, a duty to develop one's
talents and character). The duty to keep one's promises is perfect because if people broke their promises
whenever they were inclined to do so, no one would take promises seriously and the institution of promising
could not exist. The duty to develop one's talents and character is imperfect, because it is possible to imagine a
world where no one did this, but not rational to will that that world should be ours. On the distinction between
perfect and imperfect duties, see Robert Johnson, Kant's Moral Philosophy, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/kantmoral/. A deontologist thus could argue (indeed, I take this to be Shiffrin's position) that while it is logically
possible to have a legal regime in which contractual promises are understood as containing an implicit
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Because all three traditions are part of our common moral culture, and each
of them has developed internal accounts of each other, few authors can be
wholly pigeonholed within a single tradition. Daniel Friedmann, in what is
generally considered to be the most prominent early attack on efficient breach
theory, deploys both utilitarian and deontological arguments, though he
presents the latter as more fundamental to his critique. Seana Shiffrin, perhaps
the most vigorous critic of efficient breach theory in the recent legal literature,
systematically combines deontological and aretaic rhetoric, sometimes even
within the same sentences. 35 And even the early Richard Posner, who is
identified more than any other legal commentator with the pursuit of economic
efficiency, relies on aretaic values in defending his concept of wealth
maximization against the rival consequentialist theories of utilitarianism and
efficiency.36

Notwithstanding this theoretical overlap, in the remainder of this essay I will
abstract from it and refer to these three kinds of arguments--consequentialist,
deontological, and aretaic-as distinct ideal types. My motivation in doing so
is that the essay is not intended to provide a full explication of these theories
and the relationships among them. Rather, it aims to better understand the
ways in which the major participants in the efficient breach debate have been
talking past one another. For that reason, in what follows I use "deontological"

condition of efficient breach, we should not want to live in such a regime because such a way of life would be
disrespectful to the parties and their mutual relationship.
35. See Shiffrin, supra note 2, at 730-33.
A virtuous agent can surely accept that there may be good aspects to wrongful breach on certain
occasions. Yet, if such breach is indeed, all things considered, wrong, a virtuous agent cannot accept
the economic benefits of breach as constituting a sufficient, or even a partial, contributory
justification for the law's content. The challenge would be all the greater if the primary, positive
justification for the law's content were the desirability of encouraging (and not merely making more
likely) the wrongful conduct per se. In that case, the law (or its justification) would be suggesting a
prescriptive recommendation to act wrongfully. It is hard to see how a virtuous agent could embrace
that recommendation, whether explicit or implicit.
Id.at 732.
Ultimately, however, I read Shiffrin as drawing more on the aretaic than the deontological tradition.
36. RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 68-69 (1983).
To summarize, the wealth-maximization principle encourages and rewards the traditional
"Calvinist" or "Protestant" virtues and capacities associated with economic progress. It may be
doubted whether the happiness principle also implies the same constellation of virtues and
capacities, especially given the degree of self-denial implicit in adherence to them. Utilitarians
would have to give capacity for enjoyment, self-indulgence, and other hedonistic and epicurean
values at least equal emphasis with diligence and honesty, which the utilitarian values only because
they tend to increase wealth and hence might increase happiness.
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to refer to the moral obligation to follow generally applicable rules, such as
keeping promises, and "aretaic" to refer to the obligation to seek out ways of
life that best promote human character. This terminology may not exactly
correspond to the distinction between perfect and imperfect duty as it is
understood by Kantians, but it is close enough for our purposes here.
One last distinction is in order before moving to the main argument: the
distinction between efficient breach in particular, and arguments for
expectation damages generally. I do not claim or believe that taking a
deontological or aretaic position on ethics necessarily commits one to
defending specific performance as the primary remedy for breach of contract,
any more than taking a consequentialist or utilitarian position commits one to
defending expectation damages. As we have seen, it is possible to favor
specific performance on economic grounds, given the particular configuration
of empirical factors at work; and conversely, one can hold a deontological view
of contracting while still favoring the rule of expectation damages. Our
honoree, Charles Fried, takes this very position in the book that is the subject of
this symposium. 37 But in general, it is the case that those who have criticized
efficient breach on moral grounds have tended also to argue in favor of specific
performance, and have viewed expectation damages as, at most, a second-best
remedy, perhaps tolerated for pragmatic reasons, but never to be condoned, and
certainly not celebrated.38
THE ARETAIC ARGUMENT AGAINST EFFICIENT BREACH

To summarize the discussion thus far, the standard deontological objection
to efficient breach is that it licenses wrongdoing, in the specific form of

37. FRIED, supra note 2, at 17-21 ("What a Promise Is Worth"). Note that Fried does not offer any
defense of expectation damages as opposed to specific performance; this is because his primary concern is to
defend the promissory principle against reliance-based theories of contract such as those offered by Patrick

Atiyah and Grant Gilmore. Id. at 18.
The assault on the classical conception of contract, the concept I call contract as promise, has
centered on the connection . . . between contract law and expectation damages. As the critics
recognize and as I have just stated, to the extent that contract is grounded in promise, it seems
natural to measure relief by the expectation, that is, by the promise itself If that link can be
threatened, then contract itself may be grounded elsewhere than in promise, elsewhere than in the
will of the parties.
Id. (emphasis added).
38. See, e.g., Daniel Friedmann, Economic Aspects of Damages and Specific Performance Compared, in
CONTRACT DAMAGES: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 65 (Ralph Cunnington & Djakhongir
Saidov eds., 2008) (conceding that specific performance may not be warranted in cases where the promisor's
cost of performance exceeds the promisee's benefit, but insisting that in such cases breach is tolerated, but
never condoned). Friedmann's theory of "tolerated" breach, however, would apply only to the case where the
promisor's cost is an out-of-pocket cost as opposed to an opportunity cost. In cases where the promisor
breaches in order to achieve a gain, Friedmann would view this gain as belonging to the promisee.
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promise-breaking, in the service of consequential ends. The standard
consequentialist response to this objection is that people enter into contractual
promises not for the sake of the promises themselves, but in order to
accomplish instrumental goals, most commonly economic ones: to exchange
material commodities, to induce investment, to provide insurance against
economic risk, and so on. Given such purposes, promises that can be escaped
by paying a sufficient money substitute are more useful than those that cannot.
Accordingly, agents who enter into contracts for instrumental purposes should
agree that their contracts should be based on the former kind of promise, and
not on the latter. Similarly, in cases where the parties have not explicitly stated
what type of promise they are making, the default rule of interpretation should
be that they have entered into the former kind of contract.
Even if paying money as an alternative to performance is not deontologically
wrong, however, and even if it is consented to, it does not necessarily follow
that it is a virtuous act. From the perspective of virtue ethics, the concept of
efficient breach may be objectionable because it establishes and endorses a
norm under which contracts are casually entered into and casually abandoned39
in which contractual partners are treated instrumentally and superficially.
To be precise, the objection is not that without a strong level of commitment,
the contracting parties will lack sufficient incentive to invest in relationshipspecific assets. That would be a purely consequentialist argument. From an
efficiency perspective, sacrificing some degree of efficient reallocation of
resources ex post could be economically worthwhile in order to achieve more
efficient investment incentives ex ante; this is a consequentialist reason for
commitment that might lead some or even most parties to prefer specific
performance over expectation protection. But the argument I am unpacking
here is a noninstrumental one: it is that a legal regime in which commitment is
respected and valorized will better promote virtuous moral character, civic
solidarity, and a flourishing community. We may call this the aretaic argument
against efficient breach.4 °
39. Cf Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1994-96.
One of the basic, formal features of promising is that a promisor makes the promisee distinctive for
her-she takes the promisee out of the general sea of humanity and becomes particularly attentive to
the promisee's person. As Joseph Raz observed, promises establish a special relationship between
promisors and promisees, and the value of this special relationship plausibly explains why it is not a
sufficient reason for breaking a promise that doing so is best overall. Perhaps, then, the unilateralism
associated with the expectation remedy wrongly eliminates such promissory solidarity, while other
remedies (including, but not limited to, traditional specific performance) might make better room for
it.
Id. at 1994 (footnote omitted).
40. This argument is closely related to that presented in Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration,
113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1497-99 (2004), although Markovits does not explicitly draw the connection of his theory
to virtue ethics.
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To make the point concrete, consider an example drawn from social rather
than commercial life. Imagine that a law student arranges to meet a group of
friends for dinner, to be followed by a trip to the theater. At a late afternoon
extracurricular event, lubricated by alcohol, the student meets a charming
person and perceives the possibility of mutual romantic interest. On an
impulse, the student abandons the dinner and theater plans and instead spends
the evening with the charming new acquaintance.
Indeed, the new
acquaintance is so captivating that the student never even bothers to send a text
message to the group of waiting friends. The friends are thus deprived of the
pleasures of the student's company.
We can stipulate that there is no contractual liability entailed in standing up
one's friends for dinner. Still, has the student behaved wrongly, to the extent
that an apology is due? Most people would probably say yes; and their moral
intuitions would be reinforced if we added in the factor that the friends delayed
the beginning of dinner in hopes of the student's late arrival, leading them to
rush through their meal and to arrive at the theater after the first act had started.
On the other hand, suppose that all the friends are young and unattached and
all seeking romantic partners. Suppose that they have an agreed understanding
(it could be explicit or implicit) that if the opportunity to spend the evening
with a charming potential romantic partner comes along, it should be taken up
without hesitation, with explanations to follow later. In their unanimous view,
the potential disruption to the group plans is more than outweighed by the
potential rewards of an exciting new paramour. All the other facts are the
same; no text message is sent, the friends lose out on the student's company
and suffer the delay of their evening plans. Now has the student behaved
wrongly?
Some will alter their judgment in this situation and say no; but others will
still say yes. To the extent that the student's behavior remains objectionable in
this second situation, however, it is not because any promise has been broken.
The friends have authorized the student's frolic, and consented in advance to be
stood up. They may have suffered a loss by having to bolt their dinner and
miss the beginning of the play, but they understood that this was a risk of their
agreement and accepted that risk willingly and gladly in order to obtain similar
opportunities for themselves.

The prospect that an opportunity for efficient breach might arise, and the value associated with
this prospect, therefore count among the benefits generated by the contract. And the parties may
allocate this benefit, by means of the contract, just as they allocate any other....
. . . The law's generally encouraging stance toward efficient breaches should be read . . . as
establishing a principle of contract interpretation under which contracts that are silent are interpreted
to exclude from a promisee's expectation the gains from possible efficient breaches (and in this way
also rendering restitution for such gains unjustified on its own terms).
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What is objectionable in the second case, accordingly-if there is something
objectionable-is that this is no way to treat friends, and no way for friends to
accept being treated. On such a view, the second group, even if they agree that
these are the ground rules for their relationship, shares an impoverished view of
friendship. In their willingness to subordinate their relationship to a casual
fling, they exhibit their shallowness and lack of mutual commitment. 4'
Can a similar objection be leveled at ordinary contracts enforced by
expectation damages? In formal terms, such an objection is easy to articulate.
A contracting party who breaks off a relationship and offers money in
compensation treats the parties' relationship as alienable and disposable. A
counterparty who accepts this understanding as the price of doing business (or
perhaps in exchange for a more favorable price) is collaborating in this
alienability. The persuasiveness of the objection, however, does not depend on
its mere form. It depends on whether we think that alienable relationships are
substantively objectionable in the ordinary contractual setting.
ASSESSING THE ARETAIC OBJECTION

Aretaically grounded arguments have commonly been put forward in the
property and constitutional law literature in furtherance of the claim that
particular rights and duties should not be alienated, particularly in exchange for
money.42 They have been most influential, however, when applied to rights
that are deemed fundamental to personal integrity: most particularly, those
related to family formation and reproductive choice.43 Do such arguments have
any force in contracts generally? Do they apply when parties choose to trade
away an entitlement to specific performance, explicitly or implicitly, by
contracting ex ante into expectation damages?
One possible answer is that they do not, that market and nonmarket
interactions represent separate spheres of human activity that involve separate
ethical obligations. On such a view, human flourishing may require the
existence of some thick relationships in which commitment and solidarity are
constitutive elements, but it does not require all relationships to be similarly
thick. Indeed, one might object that attempting to extend aspirations of
solidarity to market relationships will, by spreading our emotional attention too

41.

Cf Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649 (2010); SEX AND THE CITY (New

Line Cinema 2008) ("They say nothing lasts forever; dreams change, trends come and go, but friendships never
go out of style.") (spoken by Sarah Jessica Parker as Carrie Bradshaw.). Aficionados of the Sex and the City

television series will recognize the value conflict outlined in this paragraph as a running theme in the
characters' dramatic and comedic interactions.
42. Most famously by Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARv. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
43. See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1995); MICHAEL
TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1997); Frances E. Olsen, The Family andthe Market: A
Study of Ideology andLegal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
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thinly, undermine our ability to maintain our more intimate relationships with
the same intensity.
On the other hand, the majority of citizens in modem capitalist societies,
perhaps save retirees, students, and homemakers, spend the largest part of their
social interactions in market-related activities. In both large and small-scale
enterprise, productive activity is increasingly undertaken in teams. And as the
relational contracts literature tells us, in all but the simplest exchanges, the
parties' interactions depend on, and also reinforce, a web of social and cultural
relations. To exclude aretaic considerations from our economic and work life
may thus substantially impoverish our lives as a whole.44
Additionally, individual choices, as they are observed and interpreted by
others, affect the development of social norms. Parties who behave according
to the recommendations of efficient breach theory, and commentators who urge
them to do so, do not just shape their own characters in an individualistic
direction. They set a model of social behavior that others may be induced or
even pressured to follow. 45 The model is further reinforced when it is
embedded in our law and in our legal institutions.
Accordingly, those who are committed to the virtues of solidarity and trust,
and concerned about their possible decline in modem society, may have reason
to object to establishing a default rule of pay-or-perform, and to oppose a legal
theory that promotes such a rule as socially desirable. This is so even if they
would not be prepared to forbid contracting parties from agreeing ex ante to
forego the remedy of specific performance. The reason is that default rules are
not just a matter of head-counting of contracting parties' preferences. They
establish a norm and
put the stature of legal institutions and the legal
46
it.
behind
community
Note, by the way, that just as aretaic concerns can be in tension with
44. This may be so even apart from the possibility that excluding norms of commitment and solidarity
from market settings may undermine our ability to maintain them in other aspects of our lives. Cf James Boyd
White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REv. 161 (1986) (suggesting that the wide

application of economic analysis to legal problems threatens to undermine the distinctive moral values of the
law).

45. This potential for spillover to social norms helps explain the otherwise puzzling argument that even if
money damages fully protects the parties' expectation interests, breach of one contract creates a negative

externality by undermining the certainty of future bargains by third parties. From a purely consequentialist
perspective, this argument makes no sense; if expectation is fully protected even in the event of breach, there is
no reason for third parties to be deterred from entering into their own contracts. Whether their counterparties
breach or perform, they will still get their expected gains.
If on the other hand parties attach noninstrumental value to contractual performance, because they value
solidarity for its own sake, then they do have reason to be concerned about other contractors' breaches. By
exhibiting and modeling independent, impersonal economic behavior, and prioritizing material gains over

personal connection, they may encourage others to adopt similar normative commitments, which will make it
harder for people who do value contractual solidarity to find corresponding partners. Formally, this is an
externality that operates through the mechanism of preference formation.
46. As Craswell, supra note 3, has argued, default rule arguments are not easily susceptible to
deontological objections. But they are susceptible to aretaic objections, along the lines outlined here.
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economic efficiency, they can also be in tension with deontological values such
as liberty and autonomy. Inalienable commitment to a relationship, whether
commercial or personal, necessarily limits one's ability to act independently.
Impersonal trade can be alienating in one sense, but it is liberating in another,
in that it frees people from the obligation of unwanted social relationships as
47
the price of economic survival.

Indeed, from an aretaic perspective, the rhetoric of efficient breach is at least
as objectionable as its substance. I have suggested above that the concept
would have generated less controversy had it been articulated in terms of
efficient performance or efficient termination options. But the point of
articulating the concept in terms of breach was at least in part deliberately
transgressive.
In this way, the advocates of efficient breach have followed in the tradition
of Oliver Wendell Holmes, who delighted in tweaking his more traditionally
minded colleagues, and savored the thought that his legal positivist arguments
would offend their ethical sensibilities. 48 Posner, Goetz, and Scott, and their
cohort have actually taken Holmes one step further, by arguing not just that the
law was indifferent to whether a person kept his contractual promise, but that
promise-breaking was affirmatively desirable. Here is one reason why the label
of "efficient breach" has been so controversial, but also so influential. The
same theory presented under the name of efficient performance would probably
not have created such a sensation.49

47. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 15 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modem Library 1994) (1776).
Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want,
and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner
that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of.
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but
from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their selflove, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar
chuses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens.
Id.
48.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897).

The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do
not keep it,--and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If
you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes
to pass, and that is all the difference. But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils
of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can.
1d. at 462.
49. Transgressive formulations of this sort are a standard rhetorical move in the economic analysis of law
literature, where writers routinely talk of the efficient amount of crime, corruption, or pollution as opposed to
the efficient amount to be spent on law enforcement or environmental. Even deontologists and virtue ethicists
accept that it is not feasible to spend unlimited resources to combat such social ills, but it rankles to hear such
ills described with the affirmative valence of efficiency or optimality-which is of course part of the point.
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The defenders of efficient breach have not yet joined issue with the aretaic
objection, in part because the nature of the objection has rarely been made
explicit. This not does mean that no response can be made. An effective
response, however, would have to defend an alternate account of virtue that
competes with the relational account, in the same way that efficient breach
theorists have defended an alternate account of consent that competes with the
account offered by the deontologists.
Such an account can easily be imagined, although this essay does not
attempt to develop it in detail. One way to do it would be to focus on more
individualist virtues that are naturally compatible with the norm of efficiency,
and with the positivist methodology of modern neoclassical economics.50 The
possible candidate virtues would include prudence, thrift, diligence, selfreliance, candor, and the like. These are admittedly unromantic virtues when
compared with alternatives like solidarity and trust, and few of us would wish
to aspire to them exclusively. But neither would we wish to disparage them, as
it is more than plausible that they are an essential subset of that broader set of
virtues comprised in practical wisdom. 5'
Alternatively, one might take the opposite tack and defend efficient breach
in terms of relatively altruistic virtues. This approach would emphasize the
ethical responsibilities of the promisee, for whom the relevant virtues would
include clemency, magnanimity, and generosity. From this perspective, a
promisee who insists on receiving full specific performance, when monetary
compensation would fully protect his expectation interest (and when specific
performance would impose an avoidable loss on, or obstruct a possible gain for,
his counterparty), behaves vengefully and spitefully. Graciously accepting the
substitute of expectation damages, conversely, could be a way of strengthening
one's own magnanimous instincts, and of expressing sympathy for the other
party's difficulties or happiness for the other party's good fortune. Such virtues
would not merely be self-denying; they could also strengthen a partnership that
would provide reciprocal opportunities for similar magnanimity in future
dealings.
CONCLUSION

The ongoing debate over efficient breach theory is not just a debate between
consequentialists and deontologists; it is also-and perhaps even primarily-a
Another way of saying this is that it is a standard piece of economic (and law and economics) rhetoric to
purport to make a virtue out of vice.
50. Cf Avery W. Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2229
(1996) (defending practical virtues of positivism); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976) (contrasting norms of individualism and altruism).
51. As Hursthouse remarks, "It is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits
effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the
person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him." Hursthouse, supra note 30.
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debate between partisans of competing virtues. The aretaic arguments in the
debate, however, have rarely been conducted openly, or explicitly distinguished
from the deontological arguments. As a result, while the critics of efficient
breach have been offering both deontological and aretaic objections (or
deontological objections with an aretaic grounding), the defenders of efficient
breach have only been recognizing and responding to the deontological
elements of the criticism.
I conclude by returning to the focus of this symposium: Charles Fried's
celebrated and influential Contract as Promise. The reader may be asking:
What does efficient breach, or the connection between efficient breach and
virtue ethics, have to do with Fried's book? The connection, I think, is as
follows. Fried has famously argued that the law of contracts is best understood,
and best morally justified, if we take its primary purpose to be the promotion
and protection of promise-keeping. The debate over efficient breach, however,
and the aretaic objection to efficient breach in particular, suggests that Fried's
account is incomplete. It is not enough to keep one's promises; in addition, it is
also important to make the right kind of promises-or perhaps in some
circumstances, not to make promises at all.
The economic analysis of contracts, as a first cut, holds that promises that
help to maximize exchange value are the right kind of promises, and promises
that reduce exchange value are not, For virtue ethicists, promises that assist in
the development of good moral character or that enact flourishing relationships
are the right kind of promises, and promises that interfere with moral
development or that enact dishonorable relationships are not. The law of
contracts takes a stand on this issue by making it easier to enter into some
contracts and harder to enter into others. Accordingly, those who care about
the substantive content of promises, as well as whether they are kept, have
reason to care about the law of contracts.

